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Abstract
This paper aims to provide an alternative framework to previous studies of deflation in
Japan. We focus on the real dimension of the price dynamics and propose an imperfect
competition model, which describes a rent economy, where the formation of prices can be
separated into the markup (level of the rent in the goods market) and the unit labor cost
(distribution of the rent in the labor market). We use a panel industry dataset to analyze
the impact of institutional and structural factors on the heterogeneous price dynamics of
10 manufacturing sectors. Although the evolution of unit labor costs seems to be the driv-
ing force of price dynamics in the manufacturing industry, our structural analysis leads to
consider the importance of the increasingly competitive environment, as captured by rising
import penetration. Along with the decline of bargaining power of the workforce, this is at
the origin of the deflationary pressures that characterized the Japanese economy during the
Lost Decade.
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1 Introduction
From the mid-1990s to 2005, Japan experienced a period of deflation. If one excludes the
controversial debate on the appropriate monetary policy, it is possible to say that research
on deflation in Japan has essentially focused on the assessment of the respective contri-
bution of supply and demand mechanisms, eventually based on an AS/AD framework.
However, it has been particularly difficult to quantify: the best-known identification prob-
lem in econometrics is certainly the disentangling of supply and demand curve shifts to
determine the source of price change (Saxonhouse, 2005). That is why one should be very
modest regarding our understanding of deflation, which has not improved very much since
the controversy over the causes and nature of the Great Depression in the US.
The aim of this paper is to provide an alternative framework to analyze price dynamics
in Japan. It has the following characteristics. First, our contribution is strictly delineated
by the fact that we are focusing on the real dimension of deflation. However, this does
not mean that we consider it as an exclusive theoretical story: monetary and banking
mechanisms are obviously important and have to be considered in complementary studies.
Second, instead of using the concepts of demand-led and supply-led deflations, we try to
disentangle what is related to the goods market and labor market dynamics respectively.
More precisely - and this is the third characteristic of our perspective - we adopt an imper-
fect competition theoretical framework: price formation in Japan, as in other economies,
takes place in a monopolistic competition environment; the present contribution tries to
take this fact into account in the analysis of deflation. In our model, whose main inspi-
ration comes from Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and which describes a "rent economy",
the decrease of prices can be alternatively or simultaneously explained by a decrease of the
level of the rents (determined in the goods market) or by a change in their distribution
(determined in the labor market). Fourth, although monetary policy mismanagement may
have contributed to the emergence of deflation, to its deepening and its duration, the basic
hypothesis of our study is that the causes of this deflation were structural. That is why
a major part of this paper is dedicated to the analysis of the impact of institutional and
structural changes in the labor and goods markets on the price dynamics. It also means
that our aim is to detect the existence of a regime change. Fifth, it has been shown that
the deflation in Japan was more severe from the point of view of the GDP deflator than
from the CPI (consumer price index) perspective. This seems to indicate that the basis
of the deflation is large and does not concern only a few specific industries (Baig, 2003).
However, at the same time, non negligible differences have been observed across industries.
Not surprisingly, deflation is more pronounced in the manufacturing industries rather than
the non manufacturing industries; furthermore, within the manufacturing industries, one
also observes an important heterogeneity (see appendix 1). In the empirical part of this
paper, we focus on the manufacturing industries and we use this heterogeneity to try to
understand the impact of institutional and structural factors in a panel framework. In do-
ing so, we do not study deflation by itself, which is by definition a macro phenomenon,
but rather investigate the driving force of the price dynamics in the industry, which expe-
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rienced the more pronounced price decrease. Generalization of our results is left to further
studies.
The expected originality of this perspective is to contribute to a better theoretical
understanding of price formation as well as to a deeper knowledge of the structural trans-
formation of the Japanese economy since the mid 1980s, which may have facilitated the
emergence of deflation. First, we revisit an old tradition on the link between wages and
prices, in taking into account more recent papers, theoretical and empirical, on the re-
lationship between market structure and markup formation (Banerjee & Russell, 2005;
Martins et al., 1996). This tradition has recently been promisingly applied to explain the
evolution of prices in the cases of national economies, like Hong-Kong, Australia and Bel-
gium (Genberg & Pauwels, 2004; Cockerell & Russell, 1995; Dobbeleare, 2004). Second, in
applying - for the first time, to our knowledge - this framework to the analysis of defla-
tion in Japan, we consider mechanisms which are usually studied separately - the impact
of tension in the labor market (as measured by the vacancy rate), of labor disputes, of
the change of the labor status composition of the workforce, of deregulation of the goods
market, of increasing openness to foreign imports, and of market dynamics at the industry
level, through the evolution of the number of firms. Third, using the heterogeneity of price
dynamics across sectors to analyze the impact of institutional and structural factors and
trying to detect a regime change lead us to use a threshold approach in a panel framework,
in following the Hansen’s procedure (1999). Here again, to our knowledge, this is the first
time that this framework has been applied to this kind of analysis of price dynamics.
Although previous statistical decompositions of price dynamics have shown that the
evolution of unit labor costs was apparently the driving force of the price dynamics in the
Japanese manufacturing industry (Canry & Lechevalier, 2007) our structural analysis leads
us to reconsider the importance of the increasingly competitive environment in the goods
market. More precisely, we demonstrate that rising import penetration has significantly
affected the price dynamics, directly as a explanatory variable and indirectly as a thresh-
old variable at the origin of regime changes in these price dynamics. The differences of
regulation across sectors is another factor to explain the heterogeneity of price dynamics.
However, a simple statistical analysis shows that regulation has not evolved over time,
when one considers the manufacturing sector as a whole. Therefore, this variable cannot
explain the trend toward deflation. That is why it is possible to conclude that, along
with the decline of the bargaining power of the workforce (as captured by the decreases of
the vacancy rate, of the number of disputes, and of the share of regular employees), the
increasing openness of the Japanese economy is at the origin of the deflationary pressures,
which characterized the Lost Decade.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We first present the theoretical framework, in
which we analyze the relations between prices, wages and markup ratios, in characterizing
the equilibrium in the goods market and the labor market. Second, we introduce structural
variables of the labor and goods markets to characterize the Japanese economy since the
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1980s from institutional and structural points of view, and describe their evolution. Fi-
nally, we propose a panel econometric analysis of the price dynamics in the manufacturing
industry (decomposed into 10 sub-sectors) between 1981 and 2001 on an annual basis, us-
ing some structural characteristics of the labor and goods markets as explanatory variables.
2 The theoretical framework: monopolistic competition and wage bargaining
Some recent papers proposed an analysis of the interactions between goods and labor mar-
kets in a imperfect competition framework, to explain some stylized facts characterizing
the non inflationist context of the European and American economies since the mid-1980s.
This is the case of the contribution by Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003), who study the impact
of deregulation within a model of imperfect competition in the goods market and of wage
bargaining in the labor market. We modify this model to study deflation in Japan. This
approach allows us to introduce some important parameters - the degree of monopolistic
competition in the goods market and the bargaining power of the workers - and to study
their impact on prices.
2.1 Goods market: monopolistic competition
The productive sphere is composed of n firms, each producing one good qi, i = 1, 2, ...n,
entering in the utility function of the consumers. Taking into account the demand function
of goods (not specified here), firms can differentiate their production in comparison to the
production of the other firms. Considering that each firm produces only one good, it makes
the good produced by firm i imperfectly substitutable with that produced by firm j (i 6= j).
This differentiation of goods is the fundamental reason for the existence of monopolistic
rents in the economy.
The production function of firm i is simply :
qi = ali ∀i = 1, 2, ...n (1)
This is a production function with constant returns to scale. At this stage, the only
production factor is labor. But, in fact, production also requires a preliminary fixed in-
vestment (or cost) in capital, K.
The demand function that firm i faces can be written as:
qdi =
q
n
(
pi
p
)
−
1
η
∀i = 1, 2, ...n (2)
4
where q is the aggregate demand, η an indicator of the degree of competition in the economy
(the degree of product differentiation) and p, the price index is given by the equation:
p =
(
1
n
n∑
i=1
p
η−1
η
i
) 1−η
η
(3)
2.2 Labor market : "right to manage" type of wage bargaining
The workers try to get a part of the monopolistic rent determined in the goods market,
through wage bargaining conducted in a decentralized way within each firm. Here the
framework is a "right to manage model", in which workers and firms negotiate only on the
wage, and workers let the firms determine the level of employment. Therefore, contrary
to the "optimal control" model, in which bargaining simultaneously determines the wage
and employment, this model leads to non Pareto-optimal results. However, we prefer this
framework for empirical and theoretical reasons. As for the former, this choice of model
could appear surprising at first sight, since Aoki (1988) has convincingly described the
bargaining game in the J-firm as characterized by a "wide range of bargainable subjects".
However, Aoki’s theoretical perspective is broad and does not concern specifically the so-
called "shunto" ("Spring offensive"), for which the object of bargaining is mainly - if not
exclusively - the annual wage increase, especially during the 1980s and the 1990s (Koshiro,
2000). As for theoretical reasons, they can be summarized as follows: in the case of the
right to manage model, and contrary to the optimal control model, the key parameters -
the degree of differentiation of goods (that is the more or less competitive nature of the
market) and the bargaining power of the workers - have an impact on prices. This case
exactly corresponds to what we want to capture in this paper.
In the frame of the "right to manage" model, wage bargaining in the firm i classically
takes the form of a game between the union and the firm. The joint maximization program
in firm i can be written as :
max
wi
N = (wi − wu)
γlγ (piqi − wili)
1−γ (4)
where wu is the (exogenous) reservation wage in the economy. γ stands for the bargaining
power of the union. In this program, the rent is shared between wages and profits. Em-
ployment is determined by the firms, which adjust their labor demand to the wage rate
resulting from the wage bargaining. As the agents think by backward induction, this rule
of employment determination is of course taken into account by the agents during wage
bargaining.
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2.3 Equilibrium
The easiest way to characterize the equilibrium is to proceed in two steps, starting with
partial equilibrium and then turning to general equilibrium.
Partial equilibrium. In the partial equilibrium, each firm is taken separately and
the agents within each firm consider that the price determined in their firm has only a
marginal influence on the general price level. Solving the program at the partial equilibrium
determines at the same time the (nominal and real) wage (the workers consider that the
price level is given at the macroeconomic level), employment and the production of each
firm (not specified here). We focus here on the result regarding the wage:
w∗i =
[
1 +
ηγ
1− η
]
wu (5)
At the partial equilibrium, the real wage
w∗
i
p
bargained by the workers is indexed on
the reservation wage expressed in real terms (wu
p
). This bargained real wage is a increasing
function in γ (bargaining power of the workers) and in η (measuring the level of rent in the
goods market):
w∗i
p
(
γ
+
, η
+
)
. In fact, one can consider the bargained real wage as "indexed"
on the firm’s rent. That is why these two variables are evolving jointly.
Moreover, each firm determines its price by applying a markup ratio µ to the unit
labor cost. The markup ratio depends positively on the degree of differentiation of goods
(negatively on the degree of competition): µ = 1
1−η
> 1. The unit labor cost paid by the
firm is defined as the nominal wage corrected by the average labor productivity, a. The
price p∗i set by the firm i is therefore equal to :
p∗i =
1
(1− η)
w∗i
a
(6)
=
[
1− η + ηγ
(1− η)2
]
wu
a
(7)
It is then possible to calculate the "real" wage paid by the firm i :
w∗i
p∗i
= (1− η)a (8)
This "real" wage depends only, positively, on the labor productivity and, negatively,
on the degree of imperfect competition on the goods market: w
∗
p∗
(
a
+
, η
−
)
.
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General equilibrium. Turning now to the general equilibrium, we have p = p∗i
because all the firms are identical. The same applies to the wage: w∗ = w∗i . The equilibrium
can therefore been described as follows. The real wage in the economy is the same as the
one in any firm:
w∗
p∗
= (1− η)a (9)
Finally, the number of firms n∗ is determined by an entry condition. The firms enter
the market until their profit allows them to pay the fixed cost K.
A few general remarks can be made about this solution:
1. This model describes a rent economy, in which the level of rent is determined by
the degree of competition in the goods market and its distribution between firms
and workers is determined by the bargaining power of union in the labor market. It
is important to notice that, in this model, the rents depend only on the parameter
η, which measures the imperfect substitutability between the different goods in the
demand function of consumers. Therefore, the entry condition in the goods market
(existence of a fixed capital cost or, more generally, of an entry cost in the market)
determines the number of firms n∗ at the equilibrium. But, it has no impact on the
markup ratio (and therefore on prices) applied by each firm. This surprising result
can be explained easily: from a theoretical point of view, an increase of the number
of firms n∗ (following a decrease of the entry cost) affects the quantity of the good q∗i
produced by firm i (which decreases if n∗ increases), but not its price, which is still
determined by the relation (7), not depending on n∗. Putting it differently, the more
numerous are the firms, the less is the quantity produced by each firm, with the price
being unaffected by these changes. In this article however, we assume that η (which
has a positive impact on p) is a very general indicator of imperfection in the goods
market: η measures not only the degree of substitutability between the goods but
also the whole set of conditions (entry cost, institutional regulations), which make
this market imperfectly competitive. It means that we assume, like Blanchard and
Giavazzi (2003), that the parameter η is itself a function of n : η = η
(
n
−
)
. This
hypothesis allows us to restore a negative relation between the price level and the
number of firms : as p = p
(
η
+
)
and η = η
(
n
−
)
, we finally get that p = p
(
n
−
)
.
2. In this model, the markup ratio depends only on η. However, the price level depends
on the markup ratio and on the unit labor cost, therefore also on γ. This is the
fundamental relationship on which our empirical analysis depends.
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3. We do not introduce any monetary policy variables. Our focus is indeed the impact of
the imperfect competition in the labor and goods markets on price dynamics. How-
ever, in the empirical part of this paper, we will introduce the money supply (M2)
as a determinant of the price level. This gap between our model and our empirical
analysis can be justified as follows. On the one hand, a basic way to introduce mone-
tary policy in an imperfect competition framework is to follow the line of Blanchard
& Kiyotaki (1987). However, in this case, monetary policy has an effect on price
through aggregate demand. As this is not the core of our perspective and as this way
of introducing the money supply is rather ad hoc in our framework, we decided not
to consider explicitly money in our model. On the other hand, in this New Keynesian
framework, monetary policy becomes effective both in the short run and in the long
run, as shown by Baba (1997). This is why it was important to introduce it in the
econometric estimation. Moreover, as it will be seen below, controlling for the money
supply in the estimation allows us to introduce a macro temporal term.
4. We can summarize as follows the expected effects from a change of the parameters η
and γ in a "right to manage" type of wage bargaining model.
Table 1: Expected effects from a change of the parameters η and γ in a "right
to manage" type of wage bargaining model
Effect of an
increase of... on
Nominal Wage Price "Real Wage" markup
γ Positive Positive None None
η Positive Positive Negative Positive
5. The rent-sharing models (such as our model) can easily be used to found a wage-
curve equation, relating the level of the nominal wage to the unemployment rate
(by supposing that the reservation wage depends on unemployment rate). From
this perspective, our theoretical framework implicitly leads to a wage-curve equation
rather than to a Phillips curve, relating nominal wage growth to unemployment
(Blanchard & Katz, 1997).
Based on this framework, the rest of this article gives an empirical analysis of the real
side of price dynamics in Japan, by focusing on the manufacturing industry.
3 Analyzing the structural and institutional determinants of price dynamics
in Japan
Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003) propose a typology of the OECD countries, in which the
8
classification criteria are the regulation intensities in the goods and labor markets (level
of employment protection in this last case). In this typology, in the second part of the
1990s, Japan is at an intermediate level between two extremes, the Anglo-Saxon countries
on one side, and the Mediterranean countries like Italy and Greece on the other side. The
aims of this part are twofold. First, we introduce structural determinants of the rent level
and distribution, which will be used in the next part to estimate econometrically the price
dynamics in manufacturing industries. Second, we specify the evolution of these structural
variables from the early 1980s to the beginning of the 2000s, at the macro level and more
specifically in the case of manufacturing industries.
In doing so, we are not focusing only on deregulation. We also consider other institu-
tional and structural determinants of price dynamics. For at least two decades, deregulation
has certainly been the key structural change in Japan from an institutional point of view.
However, its intensity and its effectiveness should be carefully evaluated (OECD, 2000,
2004; Carlile & Tilton, 1998). Furthermore, at the same time, other factors related to
short-term cycles and to other institutional dynamics may have played a role in a reverse
direction. For example, the increasing number of bankruptcies or the rising heterogeneity
of firms’ performances may have reinforced the monopolistic nature of some markets1.
3.1 Measuring the respective contributions of the unit labor cost and of
markup to price dynamics in the manufacturing industries in Japan: A
stylized fact.
A previous analysis has shown that price dynamics in the manufacturing industry between
1981 and 2001 is better explained by the evolution of unit labor costs than by the evolution
of markups (Canry & Lechevalier, 2007). We recall here this stylized fact. We first rewrite
the equation (9) into an equation relating the equilibrium price to the markup and the
unit labor cost:
p∗ = µ
w∗
a
(10)
where µ = 1
(1−η)
> 1 is the markup set by firms on their unit labor cost (ULC = w
∗
a
). By
differentiating equation (10), we get:
∆p
p
=
∆µ
µ
+
∆ULC
ULC
(11)
1A well-known case is the car industry, dominated today more than ever by Toyota: this sector may be
considered to be more monopolistic than ever, although the level of its regulation is not particularly high
in comparison to other sectors.
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Based on this formula, figure 1 describes the decomposition of the inflation rate into the
markup and unit labor cost growth rates for the Japanese manufacturing industry between
1981 and 2001. For the 1981-91 period, the average annual growth rate of inflation was
0.73%. One third of this growth (0.22 point) stems from markup growth, and the two
remaining thirds come from unit labor cost growth (0.52 point). For the 1992-2001 period,
the average inflation rate was -1.93 % . A little more than one quarter is explained by
the markup decrease (-0.53 point) and almost three quarters stem from the unit labor
cost decrease (-1.41 points). If we assume that markup variations are a good proxy of
deregulation in the goods market and that unit labor cost variations capture evolutions of
the bargaining power of workers in the labor market, this very crude statistical analysis
suggests that evolutions in the labor market played an important role in price deflation
in the manufacturing sector during the 1990s - without saying any more about causality
between labor costs and prices. To a lesser extent, increasing competitiveness in the goods
markets is also a part of the story to explain the price evolutions in the manufacturing
sector. Based on this stylized fact and on our model, we expect that structural analysis
Figure 1: Decomposition of the price growth rate (deflator of the gross value
added) into growth of the markup and growth of unit labor cost, Japan, Total
manufacturing, 1981-2001
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will lead to emphasis of the variables affecting the bargaining power of the workforce in
understanding price dynamics.
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3.2 From the theoretical variables to the empirical variables: capturing the
institutional and structural changes in the goods & labor markets
In the model developed in the preceding part of this paper, we have extracted the following
key variables: in the goods market, any measure of the degree of competition affecting
the level of rent in the economy; in the labor market, the bargaining power of workers.
Deregulation negatively affects these variables and should therefore lead to a price decrease.
We introduce supplementary variables to capture other institutional or structural changes
affecting the level and distribution of rents, and thus to generalize Blanchard & Giavazzi’s
model. The whole set of variables effectively used in this paper is summarized in table
2. In what follows, we also discuss the pertinence of other variables, which have not been
used or were rejected during the estimation phase.
Table 2: Description of the structural variables
3.2.1 Structure of the goods market
Regarding the structure of the goods market, it seems first of all relevant to use the in-
tensity of R&D expenses (measured by the ratio between R&D expenses and the value
added), available in the STAN database. This indicator is classically considered as a proxy
for product differentiation, the basic mechanism at the root of the existence of monopolistic
rents. However, the most important problem - leaving aside the question of data accuracy
- is that this indicator does not distinguish between product innovations and production
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process innovations. In these conditions, we assume that industries with the highest R&D
intensity are characterized by the most differentiated products and therefore by the least
competitive environment. It is expected that a high differentiation of products, as captured
by a high intensity of R&D expenses, leads to high markup rates and therefore to a higher
level of prices. Unfortunately, because the two dimensions of innovation mentioned above
are not separated, there is a risk that the estimation would be polluted by another effect.
Production process innovations are expected to have a positive impact on productivity,
which in turn leads to lower prices. The overall effect is therefore undetermined, which
may limit the use of this indicator.
The next variable to be considered is any index of regulation by sector. More
precisely, one should consider, on the one hand, tariff barriers and any standardization
measures limiting the import of foreign products; on the other hand, any entry barrier by
regulation, which prevent the access of new firms to the market. These two indicators can
be found in some OECD studies as well in the annual reports by the European and Amer-
ican chambers of commerce, but there is very little continuity in these indicators and they
are calculated for too narrow definition of products or sectors. Fortunately, the JIP (Japan
Industry Productivity) database (provided by ESRI and RIETI) has been updated recently
and includes two indicators of regulation by sectors between 1970 and 2002. We do not
enter into the details of the construction of these indices but it is worth noting that their
construction is partly ad hoc. Both take values between 0 and 1 (from the less regulated
to the most regulated) and they are expected to have a positive impact on prices. In one
of these indices, regulated industries are those where all relevant categories are subject to
regulation; in the other one, regulated industries are those where some relevant categories
are subject to regulation. The latter is expected to be more relevant for our analysis, as
will be confirmed by the econometric estimation.
The third variable related to the goods market, taken from the STAN database, aims
to capture the degree of openness of the market through import penetration, which is of
course related to regulation but goes beyond as it is affected by the strategies of the firms.
The impact of this variable on prices is straightforward: the more open is the market, the
lower should be the markup rates and therefore the prices.
Finally, following Martins & al. (1996), we use other indicators to describe the monop-
olistic structure of a given market, as the result of a full set of mechanisms, which cannot
be reduced to the deregulation. More precisely, we will use three main indicators. First
of all, instead of the variable "relative size of the firms in the sector" used by Martins
& al. (1996) - as a proxy for the existence of a scale advantage - we resort to two other
indicators (found in the Census on manufacturing industries by METI): the number of
firms (respect. establishments) in the sector, alternatively in level or in growth rate, and
the average size of the firms (respect. establishments) - measured by the number of
employees. We also add an indicator of the share of large companies (for example more
than 300 employees) in the total employment of the sector: the bigger this share is, the
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more monopolistic this sector should be. Implicitly, we refer to the typology proposed by
Martins & al. (1996) concerning the market structure: a market is considered as "frag-
mented" when the average size is small and when the number of firms increases with the
market size; it is considered as "segmented" in the symmetric case. Of course, the limit
between these two cases is arbitrary. In their study, Martins & al. (1996) show that the
markup ratio is higher in segmented markets, as it is the opposite of the theoretical com-
petitive case. In doing so, they capture a negative monopoly effect of the number of the
firms on prices. For example, mergers in a given industry will reduce the number of firms
and are likely to increase the "monopoly power" of the remaining firms, which then set
higher prices, through higher markups. However, some other mechanisms may lead to an
opposite and positive correlation between these two variables. For example, when a sector
experiences a positive demand shock, prices increase; it may be a signal for new firms to
enter the market. More generally, the evolution of prices might be a good indicator of the
profitability of a sector and then have an impact on entry/exit behaviors by firms. Even
in being not exhaustive and in considering only these two effects, it appears that the sign
of the correlation between the number of firms and price is not clearly determined2. This
has been probably all the more the case in Japan during the Lost Decade, since it has been
recognized that the firms dynamics could hardly be characterized as "Schumpeterian":
the exiting firms were far from being the least productive, the bankruptcies being more
related to their financial structure than to their productive performance, in relation with
the non competitive lending attitude of some banking institutions (Nishimura et al., 2005)3
2That is certainly why Martins & alii (1996) propose their typology in considering two variables, the
number of firms and the average size.
3Let us mention briefly some other potentially accurate indicators, which have not been used in this
study because of data availability, but which could be useful in further research. One particularly attractive
structural variable is market share by sector, which gives a direct measure of the market structure,
partly independent of the regulation and more sensitive to market dynamics. This indicator can be found in
the Yano database, but for a very different sectorial decomposition. According to Sutton (2007), it allows
distinction between two types of sectorial dynamics, the Schumpeterian one (in which the competition
frequently changes the hierarchy among companies at the industry level) and the Chandlerian one (in
which the advantages relative to the size or the initial presence in the market lead to very "conservative"
hierarchies). In the first case, markups as well as prices tend to be reduced, while in the second case,
high markup rates can be maintained in the middle or long term. Other variables may be found the
JIP database (by ESRI and RIETI) but suffer from data continuity for the period under study (and
therefore could not be used): these are the degree of penetration of the FDI, which is an alternative
measure of the market openness is supposed to have a negative impact on markups and prices (exactly like
the import penetration); advertising expenses intensity, which is an alternative measure of product
differentiation, with the advantage of not affecting productivity, and which is expected to have a positive
impact on markups and prices.
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3.2.2 Structure of the labor market
As for the structure of the labor market, the bargaining power of unions is very often cap-
tured through the number of strikes per year. We use data from the Ministry of Labour
(currently the MHLW, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare), more precisely the Survey
on Labor Disputes. However, we cannot restrict the indicator to the number of strikes,
which is not the main way of expression of the workforce in Japan, at least for the last
fifty years (Koshiro, 2000). Our indicator is called "labor disputes", taking into account
not only strikes but also any "conflict" between a given firm and its employees.
Another very classical variable is the union rate. We did not use this indicator in our
regressions for the following reasons. First, unionization in Japan should be understood at
the firm level rather than at the industry level, as industry unions are often only "weak"
umbrella organization; that is why it is very difficult if not impossible to find accurate data
at this semi-aggregated level. Second, the interpretation of the union rate is very difficult
because the conditions of unionization vary greatly from one firm to another: membership
in the enterprise union is mandatory in some firms, while it is de facto prohibited in some
others.
These two "classical" indicators are completed by two others, available in surveys by
the Ministry of Labour, relative to labor market dynamics, affecting the balance of power.
We first consider the vacancy rate (the ratio between the number of vacant positions
and the number of persons looking for a job)4. It affects positively the bargaining power
of the workforce and therefore the prices. More precisely, the lower is the vacancy rate
(more job applicants for less vacant positions), the tighter is the labor market, the weaker
is the bargaining power of the workforce and the lower are the prices. This indicator is
not without problems as it is endogenous to the model and as its structural interpretation
is at least questionable. However, its use in the literature as an advanced indicator of the
bargaining power of the workforce has been very convincing in our opinion, especially from
a historical perspective; it gives it the "flavour" of a structural indicator (Minami, 1994)5.
Another type of indicator is the share of non regular workers in the total work-
force. If the impact of an increasing share of less well-paid workers on the unit labor cost
is obvious, the impact on the bargaining power of the workforce is more complicated and
4This indicator has been preferred to another one, the unemployment rate, which has been often
used to capture a "reserve army" effect as well as to measure the trade-off between inflation and output.
As this trade-off is a matter of theoretical and empirical debate, and as the unemployment rate is a macro
indicator, we prefer using the vacancy rate, which has the great advantage of being available at the
industry level.
5The post-war evolution experienced by the vacancy rate can be summarized as follows: from the end
of the war to the 1960s, there was a surplus of workforce; in the 1960s, Japan entered into a period of
labor shortage, which increased the bargaining power of the workforce. This situation came to an end in
the 1990s.
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has been the object of contradictory evaluations. For some authors, this is the sign that
the Japanese labor market is following more and more an Insiders/Outsiders type of logic,
in a similar way as has been shown in the case of European labor markets (Lindbeck &
Snower, 1988). In this context, the decrease of bargaining power may have affected only one
category of workers, the most fragile, mainly female and younger workers. As for incum-
bent workers, they may keep their positions as well as their associated advantages, which
is in the interest of the firms from an incentive point of view. According to some other
authors, the impact on the incumbent workforce fundamentally depends on the specific
employment policy by the firm, which can opt for a separation strategy between these two
types of workers (which does not negatively affect the security of the regular workers) or
for a homogenous policy, negatively affecting the security of the regular workers (Feuille &
Morishima, 2000). Although the impact on bargaining power is unclear, it is possible to as-
sume that an increase of the share of non regular workers in the total workforce negatively
affects the average wage and therefore prices. Besides, we should mention data problems.
This essentially concerns the measurement of the number and share of non regular work-
ers. In Japan, as in other countries, there are various definitions. To simplify, we focus on
part-time workers, whose growth has been the most important evolution in the Japanese
labor market since the mid 1980s. The data are available in the Employment status survey,
which has been preferred to other surveys (like the Labor force survey and the Monthly
labor survey). However, this survey is conducted only every five years (1982, 1987, 1992,
1997, 2002), and we had to extrapolate the data between two dates. This important data
limitation should be recalled when we will interpret the results of the estimations.
3.2.3 Financial and monetary variables
Finally, we introduce some financial and monetary variables, which are not present in our
theoretical model. Therefore, we are going beyond the strict boundaries of our initial
framework. Our concern here is twofold. On one hand, from an empirical point of view,
it would be mistaken to analyze the impact on prices of the structural and institutional
changes having affected the Japanese economy since the beginning of the 1980s without
even considering financial and monetary variables. On the other hand, the strict prediction
of our model is that these variables should not affect the price dynamics we are studying
at the industry level: "real" variables should remain significant once monetary variables
have been introduced. That is why the introduction of these variables is a good test for
the robustness of our theoretical model.
As mentioned at the end of the theoretical part, we consider a monetary policy variable,
namely the money supply, M2, which should have a positive impact on prices6. Following
the discussion by McKinnon & Ohno (2001), we also introduce the exchange rate between
the US dollar and the yen, although a "basket" type - taking into account the yen value
6Regarding the interest rate, it appeared to be clearly non significant during the estimation phase and
is not mentioned here.
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relative to a set of currencies - may have been considered as more appropriate. A re-
valuation of the yen in comparison to the dollar is expected to have a negative impact on
prices, according to McKinnon & Ohno’s story.
3.3 Basic features of our dataset
The evolution of the significant variables for the whole manufacturing sector as well as for
the 10 sub-sectors is summarized in table 3. The boundaries of each subsector are spec-
ified in table 4. We had to merge some of the 23 manufacturing industries, as classified
by the MITI/METI, because of availability problems for some of the data at the most
disaggregated level. After merging, we end up with 10 sectors, which are characterized
by unequal weight: the sector "machinery and equipment" represents 27.9% of the total
manufacturing value added (on average for the period 1981-2001), whereas the "wood"
industry represents only 1.2%.
A few comments can be made. First, a break clearly appears in the evolution of the
prices between the "1980s" and the "1990s": if one considers the whole manufacturing
sector, it experienced deflation in the 1990s (-2.32% per year), whereas the inflation rate
was almost zero but still positive in the 1980s (0.46%). For all the sub-sectors, one ob-
serves a decrease of the inflation rate, which turns negative in some cases. Only two sectors
("machinery equipment" and "transport equipment", which define the core of the manu-
facturing capabilities of Japan) were characterized by a negative growth rate of the price in
the 1980s; on the contrary, in the 1990s, only three sectors ("textiles", "wood" and "pulp
and paper", that is three "traditional" sectors) did not experience deflation.
This decrease of the inflation rate is hardly explained by an increase in labor productiv-
ity growth7. As a whole, the manufacturing sector experienced a slowdown of productivity
growth in the 1990s by comparison to the 1980s (respectively 3.18% and 4% per annum).
All the manufacturing industries are included, except the "food" industry; however, in some
cases, this slowdown is particularly impressive: for example, in the case of the "wood" in-
dustry productivity growth was 2.68% per annum in the 1980s and became -2.32% per
annum in the 1990s; as for the "pulp and paper" industry, productivity growth has been
divided by 7 between the two decades. As for "machinery and equipment", the decrease
of productivity growth rate has been "only" 30%. This slowdown of productivity growth
has not been stopped by the increase of the R&D ratio, from 5.4% to 6% if one considers
manufacturing as a whole, and concerning all the sub-sectors (at the exception of "other
non metallic mineral products" and "basic metals").
7Labor productivity is measured as the value-added per employee. We have tried to modify this
variable by taking into account the number of hours by employee at the sector level, but the results are
not significant.
16
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the main explanatory variables
Inflation rate
(%)
Productivity
growth (%)
R & D Intensity
(% of VA)
Index of regulation
of the market
Sector 1981-1991 1992-2001 1981-1991 1992-2001 1987-1991 1992-2001 1981-1991 1992-2001
TOTAL 0,46 -2,32 4 3,18 5,42 6,05 0,22 0,22
1 3,01 -0,01 -0,62 -0,25 1,86 1,98 0,93 0,9
2 2,77 0,65 1,96 -0,7 1,47 1,82 0,01 0,00
3 3,25 2,06 2,68 -2,32 1,7 2,4 0,00 0,00
4 1,66 0,92 3,04 0,44 NA NA 0 0
5 0,89 -0,56 3,45 2,65 11,01 11,33 0,58 0,64
6 1,02 -1,77 3,44 1,6 5,11 4,69 0,05 0,07
7 0,75 -2,23 3,28 0,91 3,44 3,31 0,07 0,07
8 -3,31 -5,62 8,71 6,29 12,54 15,61 0,3 0,24
9 -1,04 -1,17 4,39 2,64 10,76 12 0,14 0,13
10 0,83 -2,48 3,53 1,6 0,91 1,29 0,11 0,17
Import
penetration rate
(%)
Growth rate of the
number of firms
(%)
Average size of
firms (%)
Sector 1981-1991 1992-2001 1981-1991 1992-2001 1981-1991 1992-2001
TOTAL 6,14 10,07 0,96 -2,54 114,2 114,3
1 7,64 10,26 1,29 -0,45 102,18 104,24
2 10,6 24,79 -0,15 -7,36 93,72 90,1
3 12,11 21,26 -2,1 -4,69 103,04 102,45
4 2,51 2,67 1,17 -1,61 105,59 105,14
5 9,27 9,3 2,16 -0,44 132,62 130,22
6 1,81 3,4 -0,57 -3,81 91,67 91
7 4,8 5,03 0,83 -1,73 122,08 116,03
8 4,61 11,32 2,12 -2,66 143,22 147,6
9 3,36 5,19 0,78 -1,5 61,06 50,02
10 4,72 7,52 0,92 -3,5 110,69 114,64
Vacancy rate (%) Disputes by
establishment (%)
Share of part-time
workers (%)
Sector 1981-1991 1992-2001 1981-1991 1992-2001 1981-1991 1992-2001
TOTAL 3,28 1,66 0,94 0,51 15,6 18,6
1 3,01 1,88 0,08 0,03 29,73 37,84
2 5,29 2,85 0,14 0,2 22,66 26,58
3 3,39 2,32 0,04 0,05 13,52 14,29
4 2,64 1,64 0,33 0,24 13,96 16,3
5 2,24 1,18 0,25 0,07 10,95 14,73
6 2,98 1,22 0,17 0,07 10,6 12,32
7 4 1,89 0,1 0,04 10,08 11,99
8 3,42 1,41 0,22 0,08 14,05 14,36
9 2,47 1 0,26 0,11 8,48 11,63
10 3,37 1,23 0,06 0,03 22,33 24,4
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Table 4: Decomposition of the manufacturing industry into 10 sub-sectors
Classification in 
the paper Name of the industry
Classification METI 
(1985-2001)
Share of the value-added of the 
total manufacturing (1981-2001)
1 FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO 12 & 13 11.2
2 TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR 14&15 4.5
3 WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK 16 & 17 1.2
4 PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 18&19 7.8
5 CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL PRODUCTS 20, 21,22 & 23 14.2
6 OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 24&25 3.8
7 BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 26, 27 & 28 13.2
8 MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT 29; 30 & 32 27.9
9 TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 31 10.0
10 MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING 33&34 6.2
However, as it has already been stated, the other aspect of R&D spending is a higher
differentiation of goods, that is a less competitive environment. From this point of view, it
is important to notice the (rather stable over time) heterogeneity across industries, three
sectors - "chemicals", "machinery and equipment", "transport equipment" - being charac-
terized by a ratio higher than 10%.
As for regulation, the results are very clear. On the one hand, surprisingly, there is
almost no evolution between the 1980s and the 1990s. This is true if one considers the
manufacturing sector as a whole or the specific sectors. Only two sectors have been a lit-
tle deregulated ("food" and "machinery") and three sectors have been a little regulated
("chemicals", "transport equipment", and "manufacturing nec"). On the other hand, the
differences across sectors are striking: 5 sectors are completely deregulated ("textiles",
"wood", "pulp & paper", "other non metallic mineral products" and "basic metals"),
one sector is completely regulated ("food"), two are very regulated ("chemical" and "ma-
chinery") and two are a little regulated ("transport equipment" and "manufacturing nec").
Concerning import penetration, the increasing openness of the manufacturing industry
is striking. This ratio has increased by 40% if one looks at the manufacturing industry as
a whole. All the manufacturing sectors experienced an increase in import penetration. In
two cases ("textiles" and "machinery and equipment"), it more than doubled. Moreover,
the heterogeneity of import penetration across sectors has increased, as appears when one
calculates the standard deviation, which increased from 3.7 in the 1980s to 7.9 in the 1990s.
The firms’ dynamics is characterized by a decline in the number of firms in the 1990s,
which concerns all the manufacturing sectors: whereas the annual growth rate of the num-
ber of firms was 0.96 in the 1980s, it is -2.54 in the 1990s. To explain this evolution, one
should refer to the conditions of entry and exit of firms. The former is affected by dereg-
ulation but also by market conditions, which were particularly depressed in the 1990s for
some sectors and which may have more than counterbalanced the positive effects of dereg-
ulation. The latter one is essentially determined by the number of bankruptcies, which
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experienced an increase, in relation with the financial and banking crisis (Peng, 2004).
As for the average size of firms, it was very stable if one considers manufacturing as a
whole (114.2 employees per firm on average in 1981-1991 against 114.3 in 1992-2001) but
the situation is contrasted across industries: in three of them ("food", "machinery and
equipment", "manufacturing nec"), the firms experienced an increase of their average size,
whereas it was the opposite in the other seven cases.
Finally, the following comments can be made about the labor market related variables.
A preliminary remark is necessary at this stage. Japan shares with most of the European
countries a type of labor market whose mechanisms are far from the theoretical competitive
model. The call for deregulation of labor markets can be understood in this context. But
Japan distinguishes itself from Europe by the importance of implicit contracts at the level
of the firms in comparison to regulations imposed by the government. For example the
relatively high level of employment security the Japanese employees enjoy on average in
comparison to their American counterparts is not the result of an employment regulation
but rather of an implicit agreement between employees and employers. That is why it is
particularly misleading to study the Japanese labor market from a comparative perspective
by adopting a common framework and the same categories as the ones used for Europe or
the US. In this context, it is very difficult, in the Japanese case, to follow the same rea-
soning as Blanchard & Giavazzi (2003) about the impact of deregulation of employment
protection on the bargaining power of unions. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the
evolution of other characteristics of the labor market to capture the nonetheless increasing
fluidity of labor relations. This is explained by the changing strategy of some firms (and
very little by the desire of a part of the workforce, be female or young, to "enjoy" a more
flexible of working life). In this context, the major evolutions that the Japanese labor
market experienced since the beginning of the 1990s are rather de facto. They converged
to negatively effect the bargaining power of the workforce and are potential candidates to
explain the evolution of unit labor costs (figure 1). A plurality of evolutions are noticed8.
First, the vacancy rate halved between the 1980s and the 1990s for the manufacturing
sector as a whole (from 3.28 to 1.66); moreover, this evolution is more or less common to
all sectors. The bargaining power of workers is negatively affected by this evolution, as
they have less choices (less offered positions by candidates). Second, the labor disputes
ratio was also almost halved between the 1980s and the 1990s, from 0.94% to 0.51%, if
one considers the manufacturing industry as a whole. Without any doubt, this trend led
to a decrease of the bargaining power of the workforce. This evolution concerns all the
manufacturing sectors, which are characterized by a very low rate of labor disputes in the
1990s. The only exception is the "pulp & paper" sector characterized by a ratio six times
higher than the average in the 1990s. Third, the increase of the non regular workforce, in
8We do not even consider unionization, because differences across sectors are difficult to interpret, as
noted above. However, it is worth mentioning that the union rate dropped from 30,8% in 1981 to 24,5%
in 1991 and to 20,2% in 2002, the decrease therefore being continuous since the beginning of the 1980s.
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the absolute and as a share of the total workforce, is also striking. If one considers the
manufacturing sector as a whole, part-time employment (which is the main component of
the non regular employment) represents on average 15.6% of the total employment in the
1980s and 18.6% in the 1990s9. This increase concerns all the sectors, but here again, the
differences across sectors are striking: this figure varies from 37.8% in the "food" industry
to 11.6% in the "transport equipment" industry. This increase of the share of the non
regular employment, associated with a stable wage differential between regular and non
regular employees - the latter earning on average 35% less than the former - mechanically
leads to a decrease of the unit labor cost at the aggregate level. This impact is confirmed as
one of the main motivation of the firms in hiring non regular workers in surveys conducted
by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.
4 An econometric analysis of the structural factors of deflation in Japan
4.1 Objective and approach
We consider a balanced panel of 10 sectors over the period 1981-2001 (21 years). Except
the regulation variable (which can take values equal to zero), all the variables are in loga-
rithm to facilitate the interpretation of estimated coefficients. As stated by Hsiao (2003),
the advantages of using panel data are associated to some problems: they are deeply linked
to the issue of heterogeneity and stability of the economic relations which are estimated.
Ignoring heterogeneity among cross-sectional or time-series parameters could lead to in-
consistent or meaningless estimates of interesting parameters.
The simplest method in order to introduce parameter heterogeneity consists of assuming
that the constants of the model are different across individuals10. This specification - known
as the individual effects model - allows us to capture the timeless (or structural) dimension
of the heterogeneity:
Pi,t = µi + βXit + ǫit (12)
Where Pi,t is the price for the sector i and the period t and Xit is the regressors matrix.
The individual effect µi can be fixed or random. Our choice between these two specifica-
tions will be determined by a standard Hausman test. However, this model has two major
drawbacks. Firstly, it implies that the impact of the variables on the price is constant
during the 21 year period. This hypothesis is highly improbable if one considers the price
dynamics as analyzed in the preceding sections. Second, it implicitly assumes that the
prices in all sectors are characterized by the same dynamics, which is obviously unrealistic.
9This evolution is much more impressive in the case of non-manufacturing industries. Consequently,
part-time workers represented more than 20% of the total workers by the end of the 1990s.
10The results of this specification are presented in section 4.2
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One solution to circumvent both issues consists of introducing threshold effects in a
linear panel. More precisely, we use a Panel Threshold regression (PTR) model (Hansen,
1999). In this case, the transition mechanism between extreme regimes is very simple:
at each date, if the threshold variable observed for a given sector is smaller than a given
value, called the threshold parameter, the price relation is defined by a particular regime,
which is different from the regime used if the threshold variable is larger than the threshold
parameter. We develop this methodology and give the results in section 5.3.
Finally, it is worth mentioning two other issues related to our estimation procedure.
First, we do not investigate the problem of non stationarity. This choice is motivated by
the fact that the consequences of non stationarity in linear panel models are not equivalent
to those generally pointed out in a time series context11. Second, the key issue of causality
between prices and wages has not been considered, as no solution is available in panel
econometrics to our knowledge.
4.2 Estimation without threshold effect
The objectives of this section are twofold. First, we want to identify which structural
variables have a significant impact on prices dynamics and whether this conforms to the
theoretical relations. Second, the estimated coefficients obtained will be used as benchmark
for the threshold approach (section 4.3). The estimated equation is as follows:
Pi,t = µi + α1prodtyi,t + α2RDi,t + α3regui,t + α4mpeni,t (13)
+ α5firmsi,t + α6av_sizei,t + α7vac_rati,t + α8disputesi,t
+ α9ptwi,t + α10m2i,t + α11M2i,t + α12ERDYi,t + ǫit
Our approach is as follows: we first introduce all the variables and then remove the
non significant variables one by one until we get the best model. Because of the lack of
space, we report here only three alternative linear specifications. We do not introduce any
temporal term (temporal dummies) as we expect that the money supply (M2) captures
the temporal trend common to all the sectors. The results are reported in table 5.
According to the results of the Hausman test, the first specification has to be estimated
with fixed effects, while random effects lead to a better estimation for the second and the
third specifications. In the model 1, we include all the variables. Not surprisingly, the
results are not good, basically because of the correlation between some variables. Only
11More precisely, if the noise can be characterized as independent across individuals then "by pooling
the cross section and time series observations, we may attenuate the strong effect of the residuals in the
regression while retaining the strength of the signal given by the explanatory variables. In such a case
we can expect a panel-pooled regression to provide a consistent estimate of some long run regression
coefficient" (Phillips and Moon, 1999).
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Table 5: Results of the linear estimation
Price Index of value added Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Productivity −0, 784⋆⋆⋆
(−15,2)
−0, 61⋆⋆⋆
(−15,2)
−0, 648⋆⋆⋆
(−17,2)
R&D −0, 055
(−1,48)
− −
Regulation 0, 382⋆
(1,95)
0, 439⋆⋆⋆
(2,87)
0, 46⋆⋆⋆
(3,07)
Import 0, 015
(0,44)
−0, 112⋆⋆⋆
(−4,11)
−0, 092⋆⋆⋆
(−3,51)
Number of firms 0, 054
(0,75)
−0, 271⋆⋆⋆
(−4,06)
−0, 204⋆⋆⋆
(−3,08)
Average size −0, 119
(−1,32)
−0, 063
(−0,63)
−
Vacancy rate 0, 005
(0,76)
0, 036⋆⋆⋆
(5,07)
0, 032⋆⋆⋆
(4,91)
Disputes 0, 0169
(1,09)
0, 037⋆⋆⋆
(2,5)
0, 039⋆⋆⋆
(2,82)
Part-time −0, 358
(−5,3)
−0, 091
(−1,5)
−0, 091⋆
(−1,78)
M2 0, 439⋆⋆⋆
(8)
0, 426⋆⋆⋆
(13,04)
0, 438⋆⋆⋆
(14,3)
Exchange rate −0, 006
(−0,18)
− −
Hausman Test 25⋆⋆⋆
(0,01)
0
(1,00)
0
(1,00)
Notes: Model 1 is estimated with fixed effects; models 2 and 3
are estimated with random effects. t− statistics are in parenthe-
ses. ***: significance level at 1%, **: significance level at 5%,*:
significance level at 10%. For the Hausman Test, the χ2 and the
p-value are reported (p-value in parentheses).
productivity, the regulation index, the share of part-time workers, and the money supply
are significant with the expected signs. The vacancy rate has the expected sign (positive)
but is not significant. As for the other variables (R&D intensity, import penetration, num-
ber of firms, average size of the firms, number of disputes, and exchange rate), they are
all not significant with an unexpected sign. Then, we remove successively the exchange
rate and the R&D ratio. The second model presented here has therefore 9 variables. The
results are much better: all the variables are significant with the expected sign, with the
exception of the average size of the firms (not significant and unexpected sign).
Therefore, we remove this last variable and estimate model 3 with 8 explanatory vari-
ables. All the variables are now significant with the expected sign. We remark that, as
expected, labour productivity and the money supply have a very strong impact on the
price level. A 1 % increase of labour productivity brings about a 0.65 % decrease of prices
and a 1 % increase of M2 increases prices by 0.44 %. The three variables capturing the
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bargaining power of unions (the vacancy rate, the number of disputes, and the share of
part-time workers) are all significant (at the 1 % level for the two first and at the 10% for
the share of part-time workers): their respective estimated elasticities are 0.03%, 0.04%
and -0.09%. The three variables (regulation index, import penetration and number of
firms) capturing the degree of competition are significant at the 1% level: their elasticities
are respectively 0.46%, -0.09% and -0.2%. To sum-up, this simple estimation leads us to
qualify the stylized fact of section 3.1: the labor market variables (vacancy rate, number
of labor disputes, and part-time workers) have a significant impact on price dynamics; but
this is also the case for the goods market variables (regulation, import penetration, and
number of firms), which have globally higher elasticities. Therefore, they should be taken
into account carefully in analysis of price dynamics in Japan since the 1980s.
Finally, a few comments can be made about the three variables that were removed.
The possible insignificance of R&D intensity has been already explained. As for the av-
erage size of firms, the insignificant results could be for two different reasons: first, this
variable is correlated (weakly) with the number of firms; second, the average size of firms
is probably correlated (more than the number of firms) to business cycles (during booms,
firms increase both prices and production, which increases in turn their average size). As
for the rejection of the exchange rate as an explanatory variable of price dynamics in the
manufacturing sector between 1981-2001, it does not lead us to conclude that the story by
McKinnon and Ohno is invalid. Their approach is fundamentally at the macro level and
does not fit well with ours. Finally, it is worth noting that our results are weakened by
the fact that potential explanatory variables are certainly missing. This means that the
unexplained variance is far from being negligible.
As noted above, the preceding approach has a major drawback as it assumes that the
relation between prices and explanatory variables is the same over time and for all individ-
uals or sectors. This strong assumption is removed in the next section by the introduction
of threshold effects.
4.3 Threshold approach
4.3.1 Specification and estimation
In this section, we follow Hansen’s procedure (1999) in order to identify potential threshold
effects in price dynamics in Japan between 1981 and 2001 (equation 14). More precisely, we
test whether an exogenous variable has contributed to the fact that this dynamics turned
into deflation in the 1990s. This issue clearly corresponds to the definition of a threshold
regression model in non-dynamic panels (PTR) 12. To illustrate our approach, we consider
12"Threshold regression models specify that individual observations can be divided into classes based
on the value of an observed variable." (Hansen, 1999)
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a first specification with two regimes:
Pi,t =


µi + α1,1prodtyi,t + α1,2regui,t + α1,3mpeni,t + α1,4firmsi,t + α1,5vac_rati,t
+α1,6disputesi,t + α1,7ptwi,t + α1,8M2i,t + ǫit if qi,t ≤ γ
µi + α2,1prodtyi,t + α2,2regui,t + α2,3mpeni,t + α2,4firmsi,t + α2,5vac_rati,t
+α2,6disputesi,t + α2,7ptwi,t + α2,8M2i,t + ǫit if qi,t > γ
(14)
where qit is threshold variable and γ a threshold. This model can be written in a single
equation form:
priceit = µi + α1Xit I (qit ≤ γ) + α2Xit I (qit > γ) + ǫit (15)
Where X is the vector of explanatory variables and I(.) is an indicator function which takes
the value of 1 when the threshold condition in the brackets is satisfied and 0 otherwise. The
errors ǫit are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with mean zero and
finite variance σ2. In this model, the observations are divided into two regimes depending
on whether the threshold variable qit is smaller or larger than the threshold parameter γ.
The regimes are distinguished by different regression slopes, α1 and α2. A first advantage
of this model is that no constraints are imposed on the choice of the threshold variable,
except the facts that it cannot be a contemporaneous endogenous variable and it cannot be
time dependent13. For our specific purpose, the PTR model has a second great advantage:
conditionally on the number of regimes, it allows parameters to vary across individuals
(heterogeneity issue), but also with time (stability issue).
There is no reason to limit our analysis to only two regimes. The estimation approach
proposed by Hansen allows a more general specification with r thresholds (i.e. r + 1
regimes), which take the form:
priceit = µi + α1 Xit I(qit ≤ c1) + α2 Xit I (c1 < qit ≤ c2) (16)
+ α3 Xit I (c2 < qit ≤ c3) + ...+ αr Xit I (cr < qit) + ǫit
where the threshold parameters cj are sorted, c1 < ... < cr.
The estimation procedure is as follows. First, the parameters αi for i = 1, ..., r are
estimated according to the least squares sequential procedure. For example, if we consider a
single threshold model, for a given value of the threshold parameter c, the slope coefficients
α1 and α2 can be estimated by OLS. Then, we can compute the sum of squared errors,
13The choice of this threshold variable is discussed further below.
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denoted S1(c):
S1(c) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
ǫˆ2it (17)
The threshold parameter c is then estimated by minimizing S1(c).
cˆ = ArgMinc S1(cˆ) (18)
As stressed by Hansen (1999), the minimization problem can be reduced to searching over
values of c equalling the distinct values of qit in the sample. However, it is undesirable to
select a threshold c, which leads to too few observations in one or other regime. For this
reason, we impose a supplementary constraint : there should be at least T/2 observations
in a given regime14.
The next step is to determine whether the threshold effect is statistically significant
relative to a linear specification. The null hypothesis in this case describes the simple
linear specification and can be expressed as: H0 : α1 = α2. This hypothesis could be
tested by a standard test. The likelihood ratio test of H0 is based on:
F1 =
S0 − S1(cˆ)
σˆ2
(19)
where S0 is the sum of the squared residuals of the linear model, S1 the sum of the squared
residuals of the one threshold model and σˆ2 = S1(cˆ)
n(T−1)
. Unfortunately, c is not defined under
H0, so classical tests have non-standard distributions (no chi-squared distribution). One
solution consists of simulating by Bootstrap the asymptotic distribution of the statistic F1.
When the threshold effect is proved, the same kind of procedure can be applied to
general models (equations 16) in order to determine the number of thresholds required to
capture the whole non-linearity or, equivalently, the heterogeneity across sectors and the
time instability. The new null hypothesis consists in testing a specification with r regimes
versus a specification with r+1 regimes. For example, we start the procedure by testing
one threshold versus two, and then two versus three, etc. We stop the procedure when the
null hypothesis is not rejected. The likelihood ratio test associated is:
Fr =
Sr − Sr+1(cˆ)
σˆ2r
(20)
where σˆ2r =
Sr+1(cˆ)
n(T−1)
. The asymptotic distribution is again simulated by bootstrap.
14The choice of this constraint is a guarantee that the influence of a given sector in the search of c is
not neglected.
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4.3.2 Results
In the estimation phase, we successively consider two potential "candidates" for the thresh-
old variable: the import penetration ratio and the vacancy rate. These variables are se-
lected for three reasons. First, they are two of the structural variables, respectively on
the goods and on the labor markets, which have been introduced as potential candidates
to determine the level of the rent in the economy and its sharing. Second, the estimation
without threshold showed that these two variables are very significant. Finally, the im-
pact of their evolution has been particularly emphasized by previous studies. As for the
increasing import penetration, it has been analyzed as a potential source of disequilibrium
by some institutionalist analyses (e.g. Boyer & Yamada, 2000). As for the vacancy rate,
this is by definition a very cyclical variable; but its evolution has been analyzed by some
authors as the origin of the turning point of the Japanese economy in the 1960s (Minami,
1994), as noted above. Japan may have experienced an equivalent turning point in the
1980s and the 1990s15.
For each threshold variable, the first step consists of testing the linear specification and,
eventually, determining the number of thresholds. The results of the linearity test and the
determination of the number of thresholds are reported in table 6.
The linearity tests clearly lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis of linearity of
price dynamics in Japan, whatever the threshold variable we consider. The test for a sin-
gle threshold F1 is highly significant, with a bootstrap p-value smaller than 0.01. This
first result confirms the non-linearity of price dynamics in Japan. More originally, it shows
the presence of strong threshold effects detected in the cases of the two selected threshold
variables. The lowest value of F1 statistic is obtained for the vacancy rate; however, even
15Productivity, the regulation index, the number of disputes by establishment, the share of part-time
workers, and the money supply (M2) may have been other candidates. Productivity experienced a slow-
down, which has been studied intensively and could be interpreted in terms of a change of the growth
regime from the point of view of the dynamics of the firms (Nishimura et al., 2005). However, our per-
spective focuses on institutional and structural variables in the goods and labor markets; the productivity
trend may have contributed to a regime change but this is not the focus of our theoretical story, as it
has nothing to do with the level and the distribution of the rents in the economy. As for the regulation
index, it has been used as a threshold variable and leads to similar results as the estimations with the
import penetration as the threshold variable. However, there is an important difference: as seen above,
the regulation index does not capture any temporal evolution but only cross-sectional heterogeneity. This
is the main reason, it has not been chosen as the threshold variable. The increasing share of the part-time
workers is considered by many authors as the most important evolution in the Japanese labor market for
the last 25 years (Sako & Sato, 1997); however, we did not use it as a threshold variable because of data
problems explained above. The number of disputes by establishment has not been selected, as it is less
significant than the vacancy rate and the share of part-time workers; it has also been recognized that the
number of disputes may not be the best proxy for the bargaining power of workers in Japan. Finally, M2
has not been selected because it is fundamentally a monetary policy variable.
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Table 6: Tests of linearity and determination of the number of regimes
Threshold Variable
Import Penetration Vacancy Rate
One Threshold
RSS 0.357 0.420
F1 65.9 22.8
p− value 0 0
Two Thresholds
RSS 0.293 0.354
F2 47.2 33.3
p− value 0.08 0.05
Three Thresholds
RSS 0.269 0.329
F3 51.7 22.8
p− value 0.00 0.09
Note: p− values are obtained with 300 simu-
lations.
in this case, the value of the test is largely below the critical values at standard levels. The
likelihood ratio tests F2 and F3 are also significant at a level of 10% for the two variables.
Thus, there are at least four regimes. According to Hansen’s procedure, it would be neces-
sary to estimate and test four thresholds, five thresholds and so on, until the corresponding
F-test is statistically not significant. However, we limit our analysis to a model with at
most three threshold parameters (i.e. four regimes). This choice can be justified by two
arguments (Hurlin, 2006). Firstly, the computational costs of the estimation are very im-
portant for panel models with more than four regimes. Secondly, when a supplementary
regime is introduced, it does not affect (or only slightly affects) the estimates of the other
threshold parameters and the estimates of the slope parameters in the existing regimes.
Looking at table 6, we can also determine the optimal threshold variable among the two
"candidates". Our choice is justified by two criteria: we select the threshold variable which
minimizes the sum of squared residuals (Hansen, 1999) and which leads to the strongest
rejection of the linearity hypothesis16. According to these two criteria, the model with im-
port penetration as the threshold variable is the optimal one (F1 = 65.9 and RSS = 0.269).
To check the robustness of our results, it is however useful to analyze not only the results
when the import penetration is the threshold variable but also when the vacancy rate is
16As suggested by Gonzàlez et al. (2005), the "optimal" threshold variable in a panel smooth transition
model corresponds to the variable which leads to the strongest rejection of the linearity hypothesis. We
extend here this result to the PTR class of model.
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used.
Results when import penetration is the threshold variable. The estimates of
the parameters of the PTR models with four regimes and the corresponding t-statistics
based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in Table 7, together
with the thresholds’ values. These parameters are important because they show when
the transition between two regimes occured. For instance, if the logarithm of the import
penetration is more than 1.27 (value of the first threshold, corresponding to an import
penetration rate of 3,56 %), the concerned sector switches to the second regime. According
to these values, we can deduce the distribution of the sectors among the different regimes
(table 8). We also plot this transition with respect to time and sector (figure 2).
Table 7: Four Regimes Panel Model: Estimated Parameters
Dependent variable: price Transition: Import Penetration
Regime Low Middle Low Middle High High
Productivity −0.601⋆⋆⋆
(−16.5)
−0.652⋆⋆⋆
(−20.3)
−0.608⋆⋆⋆
(−16.8)
−0.745⋆⋆⋆
(−10.3)
Regulation 0.980⋆⋆⋆
(4.52)
0.319⋆⋆⋆
(2.50)
0.291⋆⋆⋆
(2.41)
−2.18⋆⋆⋆
(−3.7355)
Import 0.031
(1.26)
−0.046
(−1.35)
−0.158⋆⋆⋆
(−3.29)
−0.103⋆⋆⋆
(−2.40)
Vacancy rate −0.016⋆⋆⋆
(−2.84)
0.045⋆⋆⋆
(6.10)
0.001
(0.12)
−0.0160⋆⋆
(−2.04)
Disputes −0.004
(−0.36)
0.016
(1.06)
0.012
(0.91)
0.197⋆⋆⋆
(3.69)
Part-Time −0.139⋆⋆⋆
(−2.51)
0.035
(0.60)
−0.040
(−0.67)
−0.840⋆⋆⋆
(−8.40)
M2 0.3535⋆⋆⋆
(12.2)
0.322⋆⋆⋆
(11.05)
0.366⋆⋆⋆
(11.3)
0.562⋆⋆⋆
(15.8)
Threshold 1.27 1.82 2.43
Note: t − statistics are in parentheses.***: significance level at 1%, **: sig-
nificance level at 5%,*: significance level at 10%.
Before going into details of the results, three preliminary comments should be made.
First, the variable "number of firms", when included in our estimations, is either insignif-
icant or significant with unexpected sign (positive). As this variable did not capture the
monopoly power effect we expected and also generated astonishing and incoherent results
in the estimation of the other variables, we have decided to remove it. Second, one ob-
serves that the import penetration variable regularly increases for all the sectors. This
result implies that the sector can move to the next regime but will not return to the former
one. Therefore, this variable allows us to capture the evolution over time: indeed, 60 % of
the observations of the first regime (28 of 47 observations) are concentrated in the 1981-89
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Table 8: Distribution of Observations by Regimes (Transition: Import Penetra-
tion)
Regime Low Middle Low Middle High High
Sector 1 0 0 21 0
Sector 2 0 0 8 13
Sector 3 0 0 6 15
Sector 4 21 0 0 0
Sector 5 0 0 21 0
Sector 6 16 5 0 0
Sector 7 1 20 0 0
Sector 8 0 12 3 6
Sector 9 9 10 2 0
Sector 10 0 13 8 0
Total 47 60 69 34
period and 53 % of the observations of the fourth regime (18 of 34 observations) are con-
centrated in the 1996-2001 period. However, this does not mean that all the sectors are
converging towards the last regime, as only three sectors are concerned. Our framework
also allows us to capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity in clustering all the sectors with
the same import penetration (Figure 2).
The distribution of the observations by regimes can be summarized as follows. The first
regime contains 47 observations shared out among four sectors (sector 4 - "paper products,
printing and publishing" - is integrally included in this regime, and sector 6 - "nonmetallic
mineral products" - is included until 1996). The second regime (middle inferior) contains
60 observations and five sectors cross it; sector 7 - "Basic metals" - is included in this
regime from 1982 to 2001. The third regime contains 69 observations: only three sectors
do not cross it, while sectors 1 and 5 - "food" and "chemical" - are integrally included in
this regime. Finally, the fourth regime contains 34 observations (including only sectors 2,
3 and 8, "textiles", "woods" and "machinery and equipment"). As it can be seen from this
brief description, it is difficult to draw any strong conclusions from the distribution of sec-
tors across regimes. For example, very different sectors like "food" and "chemical" coexist
in the same regime. We can nonetheless recognize that the second regime is populated
mainly by the core of the Japanese manufacturing industries ("basic metals", "machinery
and equipment", and "transport equipment") while two traditional industries ("textiles"
and "wood") are dominant in the fourth regime.
All the 7 variables we analyze (after having removed the number of firms, by com-
parison to the best model of estimation without threshold) are significant in at least one
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Figure 2: Representation of Transition with Import Penetration
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regime (in only the fourth regime in the case of labor disputes) and have the expected sign
when they are significant, but their significance varies depending on the regime. However,
there are two problems concerning two significant variables with an unexpected sign, for
which we could not find any solution or explanation at this stage: these are the vacancy
rate in the first and the fourth regimes (negative signs) and the regulation index in the
fourth regime (negative sign)17. However, these two problems are relatively minor, if one
considers the fact that we have the estimation for seven variables in four regimes and that
these variables are significant with the expected sign otherwise (in the second regime only
in the case of the vacancy rate).
In the four regimes, the impacts of labour productivity and the money supply (M2)
on prices remain important, very significant (at 1 % level), and close to those obtained
with the linear specification. As for import penetration, it becomes significant (with the
expected negative sign) in the third and fourth regimes. It can be interpreted as follows:
an increase of import penetration has no effect on prices when the degree of openness of
the sector remains low (import penetration lower than 6,2 % according to the value of
the second threshold). As for the regulation index, its impact is very strong in the first
regime (0.98, that is more than double in comparison to the estimation without threshold),
then still significant but much less strong in the second and third regimes (approximately
0.3) and finally significant with an unexpected sign in the fourth regime, as emphasized
above. One possible explanation of this last result is that the fourth regime includes two
sectors, for which the regulation index is zero ("textile" and "wood"), beside the sector
"machinery".
Results when the threshold variables is the vacancy rate The results when the
vacancy rate is the threshold variable - which are reported in appendix 2 - are a useful
complement to the former ones, when import penetration is the threshold variable. As in
the former exercise, the observations are not equally distributed across sectors and over
time. Nevertheless, there are some differences. In the case of the vacancy rate as the
threshold variable, there is no sector entirely in any one given regime, while the evolution
of the distribution over time is even more pronounced than in the case when the import
penetration is the threshold variable: all the sectors indeed cross the four regimes, with
the exception of "textiles" and "basic metals", which do not cross the first regime. As the
vacancy rate experienced a decline over time, it means that this exercise helps us to bet-
ter capture the evolution over time of price dynamics than the cross-sectional heterogeneity.
If we turn our attention to the coefficients, we note that they all have the expected
sign, when they are significant. As a whole, they are similar to the ones obtained in the
estimations without threshold effects and with the threshold effect captured by import
penetration, especially in the cases of productivity and money supply. However, some
17One explanation is provided below regarding the regulation index.
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differences have to be highlighted. As for import penetration, this estimation leads to a
significant result only in the second regime and with an elasticity which is three to four
times less than in the preceding estimation. Regarding the regulation index, one observes
a significant impact, which is increasing over time (from 0.36 in the fourth regime to 0.65
in the first regime). Among the labor-market related variables, the ratio of labor disputes
is now the most significant variable (with the expected positive sign), followed by the share
of part-time workers. As for the vacancy rate, it is significant with the expected sign in
only the third regime. As a whole, the driving forces of price dynamics in Japan seem to
have changed over time. In the 1980s (essentially the fourth and the third regimes), the la-
bor market related variables are dominant (2 to 3 significant variables), while in the 1990s
(second and first regimes),price dynamics are more driven by the goods market related
variables: import penetration and the regulation index are both significant in the second
regime, and the coefficient of this last variable in the fourth regime is almost double its
value in the fourth regime.
Therefore, these results are coherent with the preceding ones, and allow us to partly
explain the Japanese deflation in the 1990s, as Japan experienced at once a higher inter-
national openness in most industries and a global erosion of workers’ bargaining power.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have proposed an alternative theoretical and empirical framework
to analyze price dynamics in Japan. Rather than disentangling the demand-side and the
supply-side underlying mechanisms of price dynamics, we adopt a model of imperfect com-
petition in the labor and goods markets. In this framework, the price level directly depends
on the level of rents (determined by the degree of competition on goods market) and their
distribution (depending on the bargaining power of workers). Focusing on the real dimen-
sion of price dynamics, we use this model to empirically investigate, in a panel framework,
the determinants of price dynamics in the manufacturing industry decomposed into 10
sectors between 1981 and 2001.
We use the heterogeneity across sectors and over time to estimate the impact
of institutional and structural factors in the labor and good markets on price dynamics.
Moreover, by using - for the first time for this specific issue, to our knowledge - a threshold
approach in panel, we are able to detect a regime change. As a whole, our results lead
to qualify previous decompositions of price dynamics into the respective dynamics of unit
labor costs and the markup ratio, concluding that the dominant impact of the former is
dominant. Our structural analysis indeed shows the important impact of increasing im-
port penetration in Japan on prices, directly as a explanatory variable and indirectly as a
threshold variable at the origin of regime changes in price dynamics. However, at the same
time, the three labor market related variables we have selected - the vacancy rate, labor
disputes, and the share of part-time workers - have also a more or less significant impact
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and show the importance of the decline of employees’ bargaining power during this period.
As for deregulation of the goods market, it explains the heterogeneity of price dynamics
across sectors but not the deflationary pressures, as the deregulation index we are using in
our estimation did not evolve over time.
Finally, if we leave aside the fact that our analysis is probably affected by some miss-
ing variables that we could not collect, our framework could be improved in at least two
directions. First, to allow a more comprehensive understanding of deflation in Japan, this
econometric estimation could be extended to non-manufacturing industries. Second, it is
necessary to fill the gap between the results based on a statistical decomposition of the
prices into unit labor costs and markups (Canry & Lechevalier, 2007) and the present
econometric analysis of the structural determinants of the level and the distribution of
rents. One possible route is to explore the existence of complementarities between the la-
bor and the good markets, following the seminal paper by Dobbelaere (2004). For example,
the increasing degree of openness of the good market may directly affect the bargaining
power of employees and therefore explain the trend of unit labor costs.
Appendix 1: Inflation rate (1981-2001) in manufacturing industries
Figure 3: Inflation rate (1981-2001) in manufacturing industries
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Appendix 2: Results of estimation when the vacancy rate is the threshold
variable
Table 9: Four Regimes Panel Model: Estimated Parameters
Dependent variable: price Transition: Vacancy Rate
Regime Low Middle Low Middle High High
Productivity −0.673⋆⋆⋆
(−16.5)
−0.652⋆⋆⋆
(−16.1)
−0.731⋆⋆⋆
(−20.1)
−0.736⋆⋆⋆
(−19.1)
Regulation 0.646⋆⋆⋆
(4.24)
0.484⋆⋆⋆
(3.32)
0.397⋆⋆⋆
(2.61)
0.36⋆⋆
(2.28)
Import −0.001
(−0.02)
−0.036⋆
(−1.68)
−0.018
(−1.08)
−0.008
(−0.43)
Vacancy rate −0.006
(−0.17)
−0.024
(−0.86)
0.044⋆
(1.94)
−0.016
(−1.36)
Dispute 0.041
(1.45)
0.068⋆⋆⋆
(5.02)
0.057⋆⋆⋆
(5.14)
0.025⋆⋆⋆
(2.32)
Part-Time −0.300⋆⋆⋆
(−3.50)
−0.120⋆
(−1.72)
−0.143⋆⋆⋆
(−2.41)
−0.207⋆⋆⋆
(−3.20)
M2 0.488⋆⋆⋆
(15.7)
0.471⋆⋆⋆
(16.1)
0.457⋆⋆⋆
(16.0)
0.469⋆⋆⋆
(16.5)
Treshold -0.586 0.151 0.917
Note: t − statistics are in parentheses.***: significance level at 1%, **: sig-
nificance level at 5%,*: significance level at 10%.
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Table 10: Distribution of the Observations by Regimes (Transition: Vacancy
Rate)
Regime Low Middle Low Middle High High
Sector 1 2 3 8 8
Sector 2 0 1 4 16
Sector 3 1 3 9 8
Sector 4 0 7 7 7
Sector 5 2 8 7 4
Sector 6 4 3 9 5
Sector 7 2 1 11 7
Sector 8 3 1 10 7
Sector 9 2 8 8 3
Sector 10 3 3 7 8
Total 19 38 80 73
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